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Alexander: Throughout the world when people talk about conciliation and
mediation in a global context there is a tension between diversity and consistency. 
On one hand, there is the desire to experiment, to develop mediation as a flexible
process with a diversity of styles; on the other hand, there is the aim to ensure
consistent quality by regulating mediation. How has UNCITRAL (the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law) approached this tension?
Sekolec: UNCITRAL treads lightly on this issue. The general philosophy of
UNCITRAL is to avoid over-regulation and rigid procedural recommendations. We
are dealing with international mediation. It is referred to by various terms, including
conciliation, but there is no difference in the essential concept, at least from the
legislative point of view. 
The Intergovernmental Working Group (Working Group) that prepared the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 2002 (the Model
Law) was conscious that it would need to be grafted onto an existing legal system in
any given country. There will, in fact, be a number of legislative rules in existing legal
systems that will complement the body of the Model Law. So we were aware that we
did not have to regulate everything. We just regulated the primary pillars of
mediation. 
The reasons for this were, first, that the Model Law is part of a larger picture of
international dispute resolution and, second, we believed that, at this stage in the
development of mediation, procedural regulation would not be beneficial. I believe
that the development of quality in mediation should come from education and
promotion, rather than through procedural safeguards. 
A: You are suggesting that at ‘this stage of the development of mediation’ too much
regulation is inappropriate. At what stage do you think we now find ourselves?
S: One cannot give a uniform answer that covers all countries. I think we are at 
the stage where mediation is very fashionable. This may result in people tending to
expect too much from it. But there are core aspects of this fashion which I think 
are very useful and here to stay. We do not want to create controversy or stifle
development by hasty regulation.
A: So you are trying to encourage experimentation within a particular framework?
S: Yes. For example, consider where the initiatives for mediation come from: the
courts, arbitrators and even the parties themselves. Who acts as the mediator? Will 
it be the senior personalities in the trade concerned, village chiefs, the community
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mediation centres, the big law firms or
arbitration centres? All these aspects of
international ADR are still developing.
If one regulates the process too early
then one restricts the options available
– and one may be left with commercial
mediations between sophisticated
parties only. The huge spectrum of
mediation needs to be left alone to
enable it to expand and thrive.
A: You mention mediation by village
chiefs and arbitration centres. One
current theme in the literature focuses
on the difference between western
mediation and some of the traditional
forms of mediation-like processes in
first nation cultures such as indigenous
Australians and Americans where, for
example, notions of neutrality and
confidentiality have very different
meanings, if they exist at all. 
S: Yes, the world of dispute
resolution comprises much more than
western notions of mediation. The
Model Law is drafted in such a way 
as to accommodate as many cultural
concepts of mediation as possible with
the ability to operate within the legal
system of a given country.
A: Under the Model Law, are
processes such as neutral evaluation 
or mini-trial also included in the
definition of conciliation?
S: Yes they are. Article 1 defines
‘conciliation’. It provides that
conciliation is a process where two
parties in a dispute engage a third
person to help them settle it. Article 1
provides that conciliation can also be
referred to as ‘mediation’ and other
terms with a similar meaning.
Therefore mini-trial and neutral
evaluation are also covered by Article 1. 
The Working Group was conscious
of the fact that in practice there may 
be some real differences between
conciliation, mediation and mini-trial
in terms of techniques and approaches.
For example, there may be variations
regarding the role of the mediator,
whether the mediator has a more active
or passive role, whether the mediator
proposes solutions to a settlement, 
and variations in the type of persons
representing the parties – for example,
a mini-trial typically involves the most
senior management unlike other forms
of ADR. From a legislative point of
view, however, these differences do not
matter because the legislative rule must
be flexible enough to incorporate all
non-determinative ADR processes. 
Another point is that in practice 
one will find elements of mediation,
conciliation, neutral evaluation and
even mini-trial in one single case. Pure
cases where the mediator does not offer
his or her opinion in a direct or indirect
manner are rare in international
commercial dispute resolution. 
So the short answer to your question
is yes. All these processes fit into the
broad definition of ‘conciliation’
whereby parties engage a third person
to assist them in resolving their
differences. 
A: So in essence it comes back to 
the tension between flexibility and
regulation. If the Working Group had
been clearer about definitions, would 
it have lost some of the flexibility of
conciliation?
S: Yes. Flexibility is one of the core
features of mediation that makes it a
very attractive process for disputants
because they can adjust the process 
to suit their needs.
A: You earlier spoke about the 
need for quality processes, saying 
that in your view quality comes from
education. If we link that idea to the
different sorts of processes that might
arise under the definition of
conciliation – mini-trial, neutral
evaluation, conciliation and mediation
– it seems that a need emerges to
educate clients and lawyers about the
distinctions between these processes.
Clients need to be in a position to give
informed consent to the process in
which they participate.
S: My reaction to your question is
that the environment itself would
define the need for process
differentiation. In a particular country,
a party may well be familiar with the
kind of processes that would work well
for it in that jurisdiction and would
select from that range. In commercial
disputes one would require a particular
type of process and in village disputes
between neighbours a very different one.
The issues related to quality are diverse
across cultures and environments. 
Continuing education should be a
requirement so that one does not
attend a one week course and become 
a mediator for life. A mediator needs 
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to develop and always learn new things
and evaluate their own experience.
Only in this way will mediators be able
to keep abreast of current techniques
and continually improve their skills. 
A: The Model Law provides a broad
definition of conciliation which
includes interest-based facilitative
processes, on one hand, and directive,
more evaluative processes, on the other.
Do you think there is a danger in the
international commercial field that
mediation practice will become more
directive and evaluative because many
lawyers and arbitrators trained in
directive and determinative processes
are moving into international
commercial conciliation roles?
S: I think this danger exists.
However, the danger does not come
from the Model Law or from the
legislature of the enacting state. Rather,
it comes from the procedural rules that
the lawyers draft in contracts. If the
lawyers shoot themselves in the foot by
making the process more complex and
expensive, then one cannot protect
them from it. In some cases a highly
structured mediation is not appropriate,
while in other cases it is. If the parties
and their representatives organise the
ADR process poorly, then they have to
live with the consequences. They will
learn from these lessons and do it
differently next time.
A: So in other words, there is a
responsibility on the parties themselves
and also on ADR service providers to
take responsibility for the management
of the dispute. 
In your opinion what is likely to
happen in sophisticated international
business to business (B2B) transactions
in terms of the use of this law? Do you
think that international business will
embrace mediation or will they take 
a tiered approach and engage in
conciliation followed by arbitration 
or some other ADR process? 
S: We are seeing again and again 
that the best thing to do is to leave 
the practice to the parties. The parties
can adopt iron-clad, structured sets 
of procedural obligations if they 
so choose. One sees this in some
construction contracts and it suits 
the industry. No doubt in five years
they will have invented new process
solutions.
Then there are hybrids or blended
processes that contain elements of
arbitration and mediation within the
one procedure. For example, in some
forms of neutral evaluation, the ADR
provider proposes a settlement to the
parties. If they do not object to it
within 30 days, the settlement becomes
binding and enforceable as a judgment.
So there are elements of advisory and
determinative processes.
A: Would this situation fall within
the Model Law, after all there is a
potentially binding outcome proposed
by the ADR provider? 
S: That is an interesting question.
The Model Law specifically states that
the conciliator has no power to impose
a binding decision on the parties. It is
really a matter of interpretation. Has
the third party imposed a decision
indirectly and by default; or has s/he
made a suggestion that the parties
have, after 30 days reflection, chosen 
to adopt in a binding and enforceable
form? My own sense is that the process
aims at formulating a recommendation
to which the parties are invited to
agree. The process will be conducted 
as a conciliation. After all, the parties
are free to reject the proposal within 
30 days of it being made. Therefore 
it should fall within the Model Law.
A: Earlier you mentioned the pillars
of the Model Law. What are the main
pillars of the Model Law?
S: The pillars of the Model Law 
are confidentiality, party autonomy 
and fair treatment. The single most
important pillar, which I think requires
legislative action, is the issue of
confidentiality or the evidentiary
privilege of admissions, proposals and
views expressed during the mediation
process. 
The first aspect of confidentiality
relates to the admissibility of evidence
in subsequent proceedings. In order to
succeed, parties in a mediation must be
able to show their cards and have open
and frank discussions. The parties will
not want to make admissions if these
admissions are likely to come back to
haunt them. This may occur if, in the
event of an unsuccessful mediation, the
case then goes to arbitration or other
determinative proceedings. 
If, for example, during the mediation
one party admits that its engineer made
a technical error with the expectation
of a similar admission from the other
party, it is crucial that a legislative
guarantee exists to the effect that such
a statement is inadmissible as evidence
in court or other subsequent
proceedings.
Even where the parties commit
themselves contractually not to offer
what is said during a mediation as
evidence in subsequent proceedings,
there are many legal systems in which
such an agreement may not be binding
on the court or an arbitral tribunal.
This would be the case in a number of
central European states. In these and
other jurisdictions, a judge may insist
on hearing the evidence where it is
considered crucial to the case.
Accordingly, rules of conciliation
procedure agreed upon by the parties,
such as the UNCITRAL conciliation
rules and other institutional rules of
conciliation institutions, cannot
guarantee the inadmissibility of
admissions, proposals and statements
made during the mediation as evidence
in subsequent proceedings. This is the
reason why legislative regulation of
mediation is necessary.
The second aspect of confidentiality
is the prohibition of the mediator from
acting as an arbitrator or advisor in
subsequent proceedings. It is good to
enshrine this point in legislation and
make the prohibition clear so as to 
give the parties security on this matter. 
A further aspect of confidentiality
arises in the context of information
received by the mediator from one
party on the condition that it is kept
confidential. In the circumstances, 
the conciliator has a duty to keep 
the information confidential.
The final aspect of confidentiality is
that the parties are bound by a general
duty of confidentiality not to disclose
to anyone what happened during the
mediation. They are not at liberty to
publish or, for example, have a press
conference about what happened
during the mediation. 
The statutory duty of confidentiality
is a useful disciplinary measure. But it
would not be recommended to have a
law of mediation about confidentiality
alone. That is why the Working Group
began with a definition of mediation
(conciliation) as the subject of
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regulation. We then considered it useful
to offer something like a ‘starter kit’
for mediation proceedings. So, for
example, the Model Law regulates 
the appointment of mediators and
expresses a few general and universally
acceptable procedural principles. 
While not essential, it was valuable 
to include some general procedural
regulation in the form of default
provisions to give more context to the
Model Law. Parties can always regulate
these aspects differently by contract.
This allows mediation to maintain its
flexibility.
A: What would you say to people
who criticise the confidentiality
provisions as having so many
exceptions as to render the concept 
of mediation facilitating a full and
frank discussion meaningless? 
S: I would regard this criticism 
as unfounded. It is perhaps even
dangerous from the viewpoint of public
policy. If I am in a mediation and I
make an admission or a proposal, of
course I want this to be confidential.
But if I have an invoice in my hand,
before I even become aware of the
mediation, and I show it to the other
party in an effort to convince him/her
to pay, then I should not lose the
opportunity to use this piece of
evidence in subsequent court
proceedings. If the law provided that 
I would lose this piece of evidence, I
would be in a quandary. I would want
to use the invoice in the mediation, 
but would scarcely be able to do so
because, if the mediation failed, I
would need the invoice as evidence 
to prove my case in court. 
Perfectly admissible evidence that
existed before mediation takes place
does not become inadmissible solely 
by virtue of the fact that it was used 
in mediation. Admissions, proposals,
statements and views, the fact that one
party indicated its willingness to accept
the proposal – all these matters that
actually arise during the mediation
process are inadmissible. Everything
else is potentially admissible. 
In addition, for reasons of public
policy, the duty of confidentiality must
be subject to further overriding
exceptions. For example, if a mediation
reveals a threat to public health, an
intent to harm the environment, a
terrorist threat or similar, the duty of
confidentiality must yield to other
principles of law.
There is, of course, the additional
general duty of confidentiality in
Article 9. Certain information, which
does not fall under Article 10, may be
caught by Article 9. For example, while
certain information may be admissible
in evidence in other proceedings, the
conciliator and other participants are
forbidden to pass on that information
to other persons or the public.
I think we drafted the articles on
confidentiality very carefully and have
provided a balanced solution. Such an
approach manages potential misuse 
of the mediation process. For example,
it does not attach inadmissibility to
something which should be admissible
for reasons of public policy. At the
same time it provides a commercially
reasonable solution to safeguard the
legitimate interests of parties.
A: A related issue is the enforce-
ability of agreements to mediate and
the enforceability of settlements. 
Could you make some comments 
about these issues?
S: First let us discuss the
enforceability of settlements.
Everybody agrees that the settlement
agreement is a contract and therefore
enforceable as a contract. If parties
participating in the mediation are
properly advised, they will draft a
settlement agreement that is legally
binding as a contract and will be able
to obtain a judgment to enforce it. So
my first observation is that the problem
is not as severe as it seems. There is no
compelling need to change the nature
of an instrument which is, in essence, a
contract. Why do we want to give the
settlement agreement the force of a
judgment? 
A: Or an award?
S: Indeed. Settlement agreements are
the result of the parties taking control
of the management of their own
dispute with the help of a mediator.
They often contain elements that are
unique to the parties and not easily
enforceable as judgments or awards.
Settlement agreements may include
revisions of existing contracts, promises
to negotiate contractual obligations in
the future, or ‘best efforts’ clauses.
There may also be clear cut obligations
in settlement agreements: for example, 
to pay an amount of money. 
It is a potential source of problems to
give a settlement agreement the force of
a judgment or an award because it was
not formulated by a judge or an
arbitrator as the result of an adversarial
process. By declaring the settlement
agreement an award or a judgment,
one may lose the opportunity of
addressing potential issues of fraud and
duress that may have occurred during
the mediation process. Addressing
those issues for the purposes of
converting a settlement agreement into
an award or judgment is complicated
and, in the view of many, not worth 
the trouble.
Therefore, if a settlement were to be
regarded as a judgment or an award,
there would also be a need for a system
of setting aside a settlement obtained 
as a result of duress or mistake. A
court judgment typically cannot be
challenged on such grounds because the
parties are not responsible for the terms
of the judgment. Such additions would
introduce technical difficulties into the
mediation system.
But these are not the only reasons. 
If one goes to court with a settlement
agreement, the amount one has to
prove is very limited. It is limited 
to the existence of the settlement
agreement. One does not have to 
prove liability or fault stemming from
the underlying conflict. Everything 
is crystallised in the settlement 
agreement. So the process of getting 
a judgment or an award is much 
more straightforward than going 
to court to prove a case. 
A: Where there is a settlement
agreement and one party is trying to
prove that misleading and deceptive
conduct or even fraud occurred during
the mediation, that party will need to
refer to events that occurred during the
mediation and may want to subpoena
the mediator. Doesn’t this sort of
situation open up a Pandora’s box 
of conflicting domestic laws?
S: Yes, it would open up a Pandora’s
box indeed. There have been a small
percentage of cases in which duress,
cheating or other illegal activity occurs
in the negotiating phase. I doubt that
any legislature would want to forgo the
tools that exist in the various domestic
148 .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. vol❻ no ❽ January 2004
ADR Bulletin
4
ADR Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 8 [2004], Art. 1
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/adr/vol6/iss8/1
legal systems to control and manage
these rare instances in the context of
mediation. 
Giving a settlement agreement the
strength of an arbitral award or a 
court judgment, in my opinion, means
bowing to fashion. Mediation is now 
a big deal and people are so eager to
promote it that they feel it should be
institutionalised in order to give it more
legal effect. But in my view we should
not go overboard.
It is a different matter if one allows
the parties to appoint an arbitrator
with the specific purpose of
incorporating the settlement agreement
into an arbitral award or to approach a
judge to confer expedited enforceability
on the settlement in a standardised
process. This may work in a number of
jurisdictions and may add a welcome
new quality to the mediation. The
flexibility of the Model Law allows the
parties to make a conscious decision to
incorporate processes which involve
transforming a settlement agreement
into an award or court order. However,
the parties will need to ensure they
select a jurisdiction, the laws of which
will facilitate their dispute processing
needs.
A: So to summarise this point, would
it be fair to say there are two views on
the enforceability of settlements? 
First, giving settlement agreements
the strength of a judgment or an award
would encourage parties to mediate
transnational disputes. In particular,
there would be more certainty and
finality about the enforceability of a
mediated agreement. Second, the
alternate view (and your view) is that 
a contract is a very different beast to 
an award or a judgment. One cannot
always include in an award matters
which one would include in a
settlement agreement. Items such 
as apologies, acknowledgments of 
past behaviour or acts, statements of
intention of future behaviour and
agreements to negotiate in the future
are not typically enforceable and
therefore would not be suitable for 
the terms of an award or judgment 
in most jurisdictions. Moreover,
institutionalising settlement agreements
by turning them into awards or
judgments goes against the principles 
of voluntariness, party autonomy and
responsibility in mediation. 
The idea that parties take
responsibility for their dispute, agree
on a way forward and remain
responsible for the implementation of
what they have agreed is abandoned
the moment settlement agreements are
institutionalised. At this point the
parties are relying on the private
international justice system to
guarantee an end to their dispute.
S: Yes, that is a fair summary.
However, having said that, it is 
perhaps useful to provide expedited
enforceability to certain settlements.
Here we come across different domestic
procedural traditions and these
traditions do not lend themselves to a
uniform rule. I would encourage states
which adopt the Model Law to use
procedures for the enforceability of
settlement agreements with which they
are familiar and comfortable in their
particular legal tradition. For example,
in a number of countries, if a notary
co-signs a settlement agreement then it
becomes enforceable in the same way
as an award or a judgment. In other
countries a similar effect may be
achieved if the parties’ lawyers co-sign
the settlement. These solutions, which
are known, for example, in Germany
and Austria, work well in some
systems, but may not work as well 
in others. 
A: Would the German model have
been an option that might have 
worked well in the Model Law? 
S: We did not include it in the Model
Law, not because we did not believe in
this form of notarised settlement, but
because we wanted countries to
consider the law from their own
perspective and include it if they so
chose. For example, considering the
function of US notaries, I doubt that
the US legislature would be ready to
permit notarised settlements in the
United States of America to have 
such far reaching legal consequences. 
The Model Law only offers limited
harmonised rules upon which the
UNCITRAL Working Group could
agree on a global level. The
enforceability issue is left to each
country to deal with in the context 
of the enacting state. If the parties
really want enforceability, they can
appoint an arbitrator; they can even
appoint a mediator as an arbitrator if it
is done with the agreement of both
parties. There is, of course, a
prohibition in the Model Law on
mediators also acting as arbitrators.
However, as it is a default provision,
both parties can agree to override it. 
A: This last point of yours takes us
back to one of the pillars of the Model
Law: party autonomy.
S: Exactly. Consider the possibility
that the parties, after they have reached
a settlement agreement, appoint the
mediator to be an arbitrator for five
minutes. During those five minutes 
the mediator/arbitrator could issue 
an arbitral award on the agreed terms,
which is recognised by Article 31 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Arbitration. 
When we discussed this possibility in
the inter-governmental Working Group,
some people said that it would work
well on the basis of the experience in
their countries. Others from legal
systems such as the United States
indicated that while it was an attractive
idea, technically it would not work
because in order to have an arbitration
one needs to have a dispute. By
definition once a settlement has been
reached there is no longer a dispute. 
So from their perspective it would 
not work. I would venture to suggest
that common law legal systems are
particularly susceptible to this
argumentation. While some may
dispute the validity of this argument,
it was considered important enough 
to exclude this form of med/arb from
the Model Law. 
A: Why would the idea of the
mediator being appointed as an
arbitrator to transform the settlement
agreement into an award be less of a
problem in civil law jurisdictions?
S: In civil law jurisdictions, the
notion of dispute as a condition
precedent to arbitration is broader than
in common law jurisdictions. Where
debtors agree that they are liable but
maintain that they do not have the
money to pay, then there is no dispute
in common law jurisdictions. However,
in civil law jurisdictions there may still
be a dispute. But this does not apply to
all civil law countries. So one may need
more than a clearly drafted settlement
clause in order to convert it into an
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arbitral award or make it otherwise
directly enforceable.
A: So from what you are saying, the
process for enforceability of mediated
settlements needs to be developed with
practice. I imagine it would be very
important at the preliminary meetings
of a mediation to look at the level of
enforceability desired by the parties
and to be very clear about this. 
S: Yes. This leads to the related issues
about the applicable law, negotiating
the process of enforceability upfront
and committing it all to writing.
A: Some people would say that this
sort of system would encourage forum
shopping. Where one party decides it
no longer wishes to abide by the terms
of a settlement agreement, that party
may forum shop to find the domestic
law least likely to enforce the
settlement. What are your thoughts 
on this point?
S: In a voluntary process in which
each party can pull the plug at any
moment, there is no harm in forum
shopping. People can choose the
mediator, the place and the applicable
law. If they cannot agree on these 
views then the mediation will terminate
anyway. In most cases theses issues will
be sorted out before a settlement is
reached.
A: Article 5 deals with the
appointment of conciliators. Under the
provision it is quite possible that the
parties may not be able to agree on 
the conciliator(s). There is no fallback
or default provision if the parties
cannot agree. If this provision was a
contractual clause in Australia, there is
a good chance that a court would hold
it to be unenforceable due to lack of
certainty of terms. What was
UNCITRAL’s reasoning for providing
such an open-ended appointment
process? 
S: The idea was that the parties
should be able to successfully negotiate
the appointment of conciliators
themselves if they are serious about
participating in the conciliation. There
is therefore no compelling need for a
complete fall-back procedure. 
Of course the parties will often 
agree to refer to standard rules of an
institution or procedural traditions in
order to appoint a mediator. In court-
annexed mediation the court may
appoint a mediator. The Model Law
will yield to these specific situations
because of the default nature of Article
5. Again, UNCITRAL’s texts aim to be
workable in all countries of the world,
so a non-intrusive default provision is
more likely to be acceptable across the
board. 
A: We have spoken about the
enforceability of settlements. What
about the enforceability of agreements
to conciliate? What happens when one
party initiates conciliation on the basis
of an agreement to conciliate in a
commercial contract and the other
party argues that this clause is not
enforceable?
S: Well, in that case it will depend on
how the clause was drafted. There may
be contractual liability, liability for
costs if a party does not live up to what
it has agreed. If the case was referred to
mediation by a court, whether or not
there was an agreement to mediate,
then there may be further consequences
– even contempt of court depending 
on what the local law provides. The
Working Group elected not to legislate
on such matters because it would
interfere to an unnecessary extent with
well-established principles of domestic
contract law and procedural law.
It is left to the national laws to
determine whether an agreement 
to conciliate is enforceable and to
determine the consequences of 
the violation of such agreements.
Whether an agreement to conciliate is
enforceable pursuant to the national
law depends on the origin of the
mediation process – whether it be 
an existing clause in a commercial
contract or an ad hoc agreement 
by the parties. 
The enforceability of such an
agreement also depends on the drafting
of the clause. If, for example, one has
an elaborate clause saying that the
parties commit themselves not to
commence arbitration proceedings 
until they have had five meetings with
mediators and explored all options, it
would be reasonable to have some
contractual consequences for violating
this clause. On the other hand, one
could have a more generally worded
clause saying that the parties will try 
to settle their dispute amicably, and, 
if not, go to arbitration. 
What does this clause mean? Must
the parties engage (and pay) a third
neutral mediator before they can go 
to arbitration? The answer depends 
on the interpretation of the clause. 
One cannot determine whether an
agreement to conciliate is enforceable,
without considering the law of the
applicable jurisdiction. Professor
Alexander, you mentioned that 
under your law certain conciliation
agreements are not enforceable because
their terms are not sufficiently clear
and certain. Hence the enforceability 
of a duty to mediate or conciliate is 
left to a contractual agreement and the
applicable contract law of national
jurisdictions. 
It may be that at some time in the
future harmonised rules on the
enforceability of agreements to mediate
will be prepared, but at this stage I
think the international community is
not ready for them. Where conciliation
is specified as a precondition to
arbitration, such an agreement would
then be enforced either by a court
under international private law or 
an international arbitral tribunal. 
A: Article 13 deals with the
possibility of staying arbitral and
judicial proceedings as a way to enforce
agreements to conciliate, in which the
commitment to refrain from arbitrating
or litigating until certain pre-conditions
are met is clearly set out. The proviso
‘except to the extent necessary for a
party, in its opinion, to preserve its
rights’ has been criticised for being so
wide as to strip the provision of its
effectiveness. What are your views 
on this?
S: It is true that the provision opens 
a wide door to instituting arbitral or
court proceedings. At the same time, it
gives comfort to parties. They will be
more likely to agree to mediate because
they will not be subject to restrictions
regarding their process options. 
A: You have spoken about the
voluntary nature of mediation and 
the fact that the parties may ‘pull the
plug’ or withdraw from the mediation
at any time. In fact, under the terms 
of the Model Law, the parties are not
compelled to attend a first mediation
session. Many institutionalised rules of
courts or chambers of commerce such
as the International Chamber of
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Commerce (ICC) require disputing
parties to attend the first meeting.
Beyond this point, the parties are free
to withdraw at any time. The theory 
is that, in the context of a global
disputing culture in rapid change, such
mandatory attendance rules establish 
a minimum certainty of participation
and, importantly, may enable parties
from cultures where negotiating is a
sign of weakness to save face. Where
parties have engaged a skilled
conciliator, they may see an
opportunity in the first meeting to
settle. If they don’t, they have lost
nothing. Why did UNCITRAL 
not go down this path?
S: There were indeed suggestions 
that UNCITRAL should draft a rule
stipulating that the parties must have at
least one meeting. There were several
reasons why we did not go down this
path. One reason was that, unlike the
ICC, which is operating with a specific
ADR clause and a set of rules
providing a certain predictability of
procedure, UNCITRAL is dealing with
the broadest spectrum of international
situations including ‘dinner party
mediations’.
A: What is a ‘dinner party
mediation’?
S: When two people have a dispute
and they call a third person that they
trust and say ‘Let’s go for a beer. Can
you help us solve our dispute?’ No one
may have uttered the word ‘mediation’.
These people do what comes naturally
and makes common sense. They ask a
business ‘elder’ to help them solve their
problem. Now, according to the Model
Law, this is a mediation. These parties
and the mediator may therefore be
covered by the Model Law. What does
it mean ‘to meet’? Would this count as
a first meeting or would it be classified
as a preliminary pre-mediation
meeting? 
Let’s use electronic commerce as
another example. What does it mean
‘to meet’? If you are in Australia and 
I am in Austria, we can meet in
cyberspace; we could exchange emails.
But where are we technically meeting
and are we meeting at all in the first
place? 
Take a very simple dispute resolution
clause: ‘The parties will try to settle the
dispute amicably, and if they do not
settle, they will refer the matter to
arbitration.’ Must the parties on the
basis of this clause fly from Australia
to London to have one meeting with
the mediator? No. It would be going
too far to demand this in all cases. This
is why we left any obligation to meet to
the agreed procedural rules. It is true
that requiring the parties to meet can
be very useful in many cases. However,
if one applies it to cover the whole
spectrum of mediation situations, 
it is too rigid. UNCITRAL wants 
to encourage as many countries as
possible to enact the Model Law and
not to discourage them by being overly
prescriptive about procedural elements
of mediation. 
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